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California Liquor Liability: A Decade
After Coulter v. Superior Court
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, 2,543 persons were killed in alcohol-related accidents in
California and an additional 69,876 persons were injured.' Over 35%
of the persons killed in alcohol-related accidents, and over half the
persons injured, were innocent, nondrinking parties.2
For years, courts 3 and public interest groups, such as Mothers
Against Drunk Drivers (MADD),4 have expressed alarm at the inci-
dence of drunk driving and the resulting tragedies. The California
courts responded to this problem in the 1970's by extending liability
to individuals who served or sold alcohol to an intoxicated person
subsequently involved in an accident.5
In 1978, however, the California Legislature reversed this judicial
trend and severely limited third-party liability for supplying alcohol
to an intoxicated person who could foreseeably injure others.6 A dec-
ade later, the drunk-driving problem still remains, but the California
courts have not been inactive and have recently interpreted certain
exceptions to common law immunity to alleviate some of the harsh-
ness of the common law rule.7
1. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT OF FATAL AND INJURY
MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS 22 (prepared pursuant to CAL. VEH. CODE § 2408
(West 1987)). These figures represent an increase from the 2,422 deaths and 65,726 in-
juries in 1982. Id.
2. Id. at 25.
3. See Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Morris v. Farley Enter., Inc., 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983);
Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,
619 P.2d 135 (1980).
4. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) was founded in 1980 by Candy
Lightner, a mother whose child was killed by a drunk driver. Leo, One Less for the
Road?, TIME, May 20, 1985, at 76, 77.
5. See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text for discussion of Coulter v. Supe-
rior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978) (civil liability imposed
on noncommercial suppliers of alcoholic beverages); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486
P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971) (civil liability imposed on commercial vendor of alco-
holic beverages).
6. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West
1985).
7. See inf -a notes 90-167 and accompanying text for discussion of exceptions to
the common law rule.
This comment will trace the history of third-party liquor liability
and the policies which have shaped judicial and legislative action in
the United States, including the countervailing trends of liability be-
ing judicially imposed in the face of legislative restraints on such lia-
bility. A summary of the historical basis for the law as it stands
today in California will also be provided. This comment will then
discuss the status and application of third-party liability since the
1978 legislation, dealing specifically with exceptions to the general
rule of nonliability and the manner in which those exceptions have
been applied. Finally, the impact and possible implications of those
exceptions in California as well as in other states will be explored in
light of current trends in the liquor liability area.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
At common law, there traditionally was no civil remedy against
servers of alcohol for injuries to third parties caused by an intoxi-
cated person.8 The rationale behind this strict rule was that drink-
ing, not serving alcohol, was the proximate cause of any resulting
injuries.9 The person being served had the choice of whether or not
to drink and therefore, his decision to drink, and not the availability
of the alcohol, determined the outcome. However, this view gradu-
ally began to change, and legislatures as well as courts sought to cre-
ate means by which the injured third party could recover damages.
A. Bases of Liability
1. Dram Shop Acts
States first enacted dram shop acts in the mid-to-late 1800's as an
outgrowth of the temperance movement. 10 The first such statute was
passed in 1849 by Wisconsin and required that tavern-keepers provide
some support for "paupers, widows and orphans" injured by the sale
of alcoholic beverages."1 Other states soon followed by enacting stat-
8. See, e.g., State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951) (no
cause of action against commercial vendor); Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76
Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969) (refusal to impose liability on noncommercial server).
See generally Comment, Imposition of Liability on Social Hosts in Drunk Driving
Cases: A Judicial Response Mandated by Principles of Common Law and Common
Sense, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 254 (1986).
9. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969).
10. See Comment, Dram Shop Liability in Idaho: A Review of the Past, A Look
into the Future, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 293, 294 (1986-1987) [hereinafter Comment, Dram
Shop Liability in Idaho]; Comment, Liability of Commercial Vendors, Employers, and
Social Hosts for Torts of the Intoxicated, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1013, 1015 n.13
(1983) [hereinafter Comment, Torts of the Intoxicated]; Comment, California Liquor
Liability: Who's to Pay the Costs?, 15 CAL. W.L. REV. 490, 497 (1980) [hereinafter Com-
ment, California Liquor Liability].
11. Goldberg, One for the Road: Liquor Liability Broadens, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987,
at 84, 86.
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utes which created a civil remedy against the seller or provider of al-
coholic beverages for any injuries resulting from the drinker's
intoxication. 12
Several reasons exist for imposing dram shop liability on a com-
mercial vendor of alcohol. First, he is able to insure against the po-
tential loss.' 3 Second, the vendor can equalize the cost of this
insurance by increasing the price of alcohol. 14 Third, because of his
business experience, the vendor is in a position to know whether or
not the drinker is intoxicated.15 Finally, the vendor has the option of
refusing to serve alcohol when he knows that the drinker is intoxi-
cated or underage.16
The typical dram shop act defines the class of persons to whom the
seller cannot serve alcohol without risk of liability and often includes
minors, habitual drunkards, or obviously intoxicated persons.17
Although some statutes are broadly worded in this respect,' 8 particu-
12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (Supp. 1986);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 (Supp. 1988);
FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-22 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 23-808
(Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A,
§§ 2501-19 (Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (West Supp. 1987); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340A-801 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.053 (Vernon 1988);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (1986); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 &
Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-121 to -129 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1
(1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Anderson 1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.950,
30.960 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-14-1 to -13 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-14-1
(1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (Supp. 1987).
The basic elements a plaintiff must prove in a dram shop case are:
1. a patron on the premises
2. was served intoxicating liquors
3. while he was intoxicated
4. under circumstances from which the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that the patron was then intoxicated;
5. the patron while intoxicated then operated a motor vehicle,
6. as was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant,
7. and a person of ordinary prudence would have refrained from serving li-
quor to that patron in such circumstances
8. the patron's drunk driving caused the plaintiff's death or injury within
the scope of the foreseeable risk.
Beitman, Dram Shop Liability, 21 TRIAL, Mar. 1985, at 38.
13. Comment, Torts of the Intoxicated, supra note 10, at 1015.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. "Every person who is injured within the state in person or property, by any
intoxicated person has a right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly,
against any person ... who, by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, . . . causes the intoxi-
cation of such person." Liquor Control Act § 6-21, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135
larly in the sense of who may be liable,19 courts have generally de-
clined to impose liability upon social hosts under the dram shop
acts.20 This reluctance may be explained mostly by reference to pol-
icy considerations that apply to commercial vendors but do not apply
to social hosts. For instance, social hosts do not have the same capac-
ity to cover their potential liability with insurance, and since social
hosts do not often charge guests for drinks, they certainly cannot
spread the cost as readily as commercial vendors. Furthermore, they
also lack expertise in determining whether a guest is intoxicated,
since social hosts probably have less contact with intoxicated persons
than do commercial servers. Finally, because of social pressures, a
host may be reluctant to refuse serving an already intoxicated guest
more drinks, whereas a commercial vendor does not generally have
the same ties of companionship or friendship with the persons whom
he serves.
Courts in two states, Iowa and Minnesota, have applied broadly
worded dram shop acts to social hosts.21 However, the legislatures in
both states reacted by amending the statutes to include only commer-
cial servers.22 These states serve as two examples of state legisla-
tures' unwillingness to allow recovery against social hosts under
dram shop acts.
2. Negligence Per Se
In addition to dram shop acts, liability may be imposed when a vio-
lation of a liquor control statute occurs.23 All fifty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have some form of liquor control statute making it
a criminal offense to sell alcohol to certain classes of persons.24 In
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). The Illinois statute does not in any way specify persons who
cannot be served. Id.; see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1977).
19. Liquor Control Act § 6-21, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 43, para. 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1987) ("Any person ... who, by selling or giving alcoholic liquor.... causes the intoxi-
cation .... ") (emphasis added); see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1977); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 11-101(1) (McKinney 1984).
20. Comment, Torts of the Intoxicated, supra note 10, at 1015; Comment, Dram
Shop Liability in Idaho, supra note 10, at 296.
21. Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972); Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn.
115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
22. IowA CODE ANN. § 123.95 (West Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95
(West Supp. 1983-1984).
23. See, e.g., Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980) (tavern liable for
furnishing alcohol in violation of statute); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269
(1982) (package store liable for selling alcohol in violation of statute).
24. ALA. CODE § 28-3A-25 (Supp. 1986); ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.051-060 (1987); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-241, 4-244 (Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-3-201, 3-3-217
(1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602, 25658 (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-
128 (1985 & Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-86 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 4, §§ 712, 713 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-121 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 562.11, 562.50 (West 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-3-22, 3-3-23 (1982 & Supp. 1988);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 281-78 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 23-312, 23-929 (Supp.
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some situations, these criminal statutes may form the basis of a civil
claim based on principles of negligence per se.
The theory of negligence per se is predicated on the assumption
that a statute may sometimes prescribe the standard of conduct for a
community. "When a statute provides that under certain circum-
stances particular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be inter-
preted as fixing a standard for all members of the community, from
which it is negligence to deviate."25 Certain conditions must be met
before a statute may be used to impose negligence per se. The court
must find that the purpose of the law was:
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is in-
vaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and (c) to
protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to
protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm
results.2
6
If these conditions exist, violation of the statute is a breach of duty
for which the violator may be held civilly liable.27
The well-known case of Rappaport v. Nichols 28 was the first to im-
pose liability based upon the violation of a liquor control statute. In
Rappaport, a tavern-keeper was held liable for injuries to a third
party caused by a minor who had been served alcohol in violation of a
1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, para. 131 (Smith-Hurd 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1-5-7-8,
7.1-5-10-14 (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.49 (West 1987); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 41-2615 (Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 244.070 to .080 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:91 to :91.12, 26:90 (West 1986 & Supp.
1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 354, 705, 2081 (Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 2B, § 118 (1987 & Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 34 (West Supp.
1988); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 436.29, 436.33, 436.336 (West Supp. 1987); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 340A.502-03 (West Supp. 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-81, 67-1-83
(Supp. 1987); MO. ANN. STAT. § 311.310 (Vernon 1963); MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-301
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. 53-180 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.055 (1984); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 175:6 (Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-77 (West Supp. 1988); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-7A-16, 60-7B-1.1 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (Mc-
Kinney 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-305 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1987);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.69, 4301.22 (Anderson Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
37, § 537 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 471.315 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-
493 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-1 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-3-990
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-4-78 (Supp. 1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 57-4-203 (Supp. 1987); TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.03 (Vernon
Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32A-12-8, 32A-12-9 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 658
(Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-62 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 66.44.200,
66.44.270 (1985 & Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 60-3-22 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 125.07 (West Supp. 1987); WYO. STAT. § 12-6-101 (1986).
25. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36,
at 220 (5th ed. 1984).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
27. Id
28. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
liquor control statute. The court reasoned that the statutory provi-
sions "were not narrowly intended to benefit the minors and intoxi-
cated persons alone but were wisely intended for the protection of
members of the general public as well."29
Since Rappaport, other courts have imposed civil liability on com-
mercial vendors based on negligence per se.30 However, many courts
refuse to apply this analysis when a social host is the defendant, rea-
soning that these statutes were meant to provide guidelines for the
liquor industry and not to set a standard of care for the community.3 1
3. Common Law Negligence
Another theory under which courts may impose liability is com-
mon law negligence.32 Although at common law, the furnishing of
alcohol was not considered to be the proximate cause of resulting in-
juries,3 3 some courts are nonetheless willing to extend liability based
on common law negligence principles.
Courts consider a number of different policies in determining lia-
bility. Because automobile transportation is so common in today's so-
ciety, it is foreseeable that an intoxicated driver will create a genuine
risk to the public.3 4 Additionally, the old common law rule has been
criticized as being outdated, since it was first developed in an era
when the principal mode of transportation was horse and buggy, and
before road accidents reached such alarming numbers.35 In Kelly v.
Gwinnell,3 6 the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed liability on a so-
cial host based on negligence even though its decision would "inter-
29. 1I at 202, 156 A.2d at 8.
30. See, e.g., Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); McClellan
v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
31. See, e.g., Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975),
zff'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976). Interestingly, after the court's use of this
reasoning, its decision was superseded by statute, as stated in D'Amico v. Christie, 71
N.Y.2d 76, 518 N.E.2d 896, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1987).
32. See, e.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322, 324-26 (7th Cir.
1959) (common law negligence action based on duty imposed by liquor control statute);
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 338, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (common law negligence recog-
nized in absence of dram shop act); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau
Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (common law negligence allowed
even though recovery not available under dram shop act or liquor control statute); see
also infra notes 36-39 and notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 9.
34. Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 632, 651 P.2d 1269, 1276 (1982).
35. 1i at 629, 651 P.2d at 1273.
A common-law doctrine which developed in the horse and buggy days may be
out of tune with today's society. The serious danger to the public caused by
drunken drivers operating automobiles on public roadways is now a matter of
common knowledge that was not experienced by the public when the com-
mon-law doctrine of denying third parties' recovery against tavernkeepers was
developed.
rLi
36. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
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fere with accepted standards of social behavior,"37 because such
interference was justified by compensating the victims and deterring
future acts.38
In Kelly, the host entertained Gwinnell at the host's home, serving
him thirteen straight shots of scotch. The host then allowed Gwin-
nell to drive home, but before reaching his home, Gwinnell was in-
volved in a head-on collision with the plaintiff. Although New Jersey
did not have a dram shop act, the court allowed the plaintiff's cause
of action since it met the common law elements of negligence: "an ac-
tion by defendant creating an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff,
a risk that was clearly foreseeable, and a risk that resulted in an in-
jury equally foreseeable. " 39
Liability based on negligence was also recognized in the Oregon
case of Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chiapter of Alpha Tau Omega Frater-
nity.40 In Wiener, the defendant fraternity served an inordinate
amount of alcohol to a minor, knowing that he would later be driv-
ing. The court refused to impose liability pursuant to Oregon's dram
shop act or liquor control statute, but allowed a cause of action based
on common law negligence principles.41 It reasoned that a duty to
the public arises when a reasonable, prudent person can see from the
behavior of the drinker that the drinker should be given no more
alcohol.42
B. Legislative Trends
In contrast to the courts, many state legislatures are attempting to
limit liability for the acts of intoxicated persons. In 1986, nineteen
states enacted laws limiting civil recovery against the server of alco-
hol in some way.43
An example of one of the most comprehensive provisions enacted
37. Id. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1224.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
40. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
41. Id. at 638, 485 P.2d at 21.
42. IM. at 639-40, 485 P.2d at 21-22. "It was not the purpose of the statute to protect
third persons from injury resulting from the conduct of inebriated minors or of impos-
ing liability upon a person contributing to the minor's delinquency by furnishing him
alcohol." Id.
43. Goldberg, supra note 11, 88; Goldberg, Dram Shop Update, 22 TRIAL, Dec. 1986,
at 66, 67; see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (Iowa and Minnesota); see also
infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (California).
is the State of Maine's statutory scheme.44 The Maine statute limits
total damage awards in liquor liability cases to $250,000,45 requires a
plaintiff to give notice to the defendant within 180 days of the acci-
dent,46 and preserves all common law defenses for the defendant.47
Several reasons are frequently stated to justify such limiting legis-
lation. First, skyrocketing damages awarded by juries and increas-
ingly higher out-of-court settlements suggest that our system of
compensation has gone out of control.48 Second, the cost of insurance
for liquor liability has risen dramatically in recent years.49
This trend of legislative action limiting liability and damages
stands in stark contrast to the judiciary's continued forging of new
and broader grounds for imposing liquor liability. At this time it is
difficult to tell which branch of government will prevail. Thus far,
California has experienced both of these trends in that the courts
first imposed broader liability, followed by a swift legislative reaction.
III. CALIFORNIA'S APPROACH
A. Common Law Rule
Before 1971, California courts followed the common law rule5o in
all their decisions regarding third-party liquor liability.5l In Cole v.
Rush,52 Cole's widow and children brought a wrongful death action
against the defendant tavern for serving alcohol to Cole. The plain-
tiffs alleged that Cole was a regular patron of the defendant's estab-
lishment, the Tropic Isle, and was known by the defendant to be
"belligerent, pugnacious and quarrelsome" when intoxicated.53 Cole
became intoxicated at the Tropic Isle one evening and was involved
in a fight with another customer, during which he fell, struck his
head, and died. Relying on the general principle that "it is the volun-
tary consumption, not the sale or gift, of intoxicating liquor which is
the proximate cause of injury from its use,"54 the court denied recov-
44. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 2501-19 (Supp. 1987). Connecticut has en-
acted a similar statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 (Supp. 1988).
45. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, at § 2509.
46. Id. § 2513.
47. Id. § 2510.
48. Goldberg, Dram Shop Update, supra note 43, at 66, 68.
49. Id.
50. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the com-
mon law rule.
51. The rule was first stated in California in the case of Lammers v. Pacific Elec.
Ry., 186 Cal. 379, 384, 199 P. 523, 525 (1921) (dictum). For other cases following the
rule, see Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Hinton v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952
(1943).
52. 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 45q (1955).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 356, 289 P.2d at 457.
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ery by Cole's widow and children.
In support of its adherence to the common law rule, the court in
Cole noted that the state legislature had knowledge of previous cases
following the strict common law rule55 but chose not to act; there-
fore, it must have intended that the law remain the same.5M The
court maintained that this was a problem strictly in the domain of
the legislature.5 7 One rationale supporting this argument is that leg-
islators have a general awareness of statutes and trends in the law of
other states as well as their own. In addition, they play an active role
in regulating and dealing with liquor questions in contexts other than
liability.58
B. The Vesely Trilogy
In 1971, the California Supreme Court discarded the common law
rule by its decision in Vesely v. Sager.59 In Vesely, civil liability was
first imposed on a commercial vendor of alcoholic beverages for inju-
ries resulting from the consumption of such beverages. The defend-
ant Sager, owner of the Buckhorn Lodge, served alcohol to defendant
O'Connell, knowing that he was intoxicated and would later drive on
a steep and winding mountain road leading away from the lodge.60
Upon leaving the establishment, O'Connell drove his car into the
wrong lane and struck the plaintiff's automobile.
The Vesely court imposed liability based on a statutory presump-
tion of negligence 61 arising from the violation of section 25602 of the
55. See supra note 8 (common law rule).
56. Cole, 45 Cal. 2d at 356, 289 P.2d at 456. The court also noted that "[t]he com-
mon law ... so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the
United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all
courts of this State." Id.; see also In re Estate of Apple, 66 Cal. 432, 6 P. 7 (1885). Ac-
cordingly, the common law was deemed to be controlling. Cole, 45 Cal. 2d at 356, 289
P.2d at 456.
57. Cole, 45 Cal. 2d at 354, 289 P.2d at 456-57; see also Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal.
2d 183, 200, 288 P.2d 12, 22 (1955) (legislature presumed to have knowledge of existing
judicial decisions), rehg denied, 45 Cal. 2d 208, 289 P.2d 242 (1956); Marchiondo v.
Roper, 90 N.M. 367, 369, 563 P.2d 1160, 1162 (1977) (legislature presumed to be aware of
problem of alcohol abuse, so decision to impose liability remains with the legislature),
overruled by Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982).
58. Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in California, 14 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 46, 48-
49 (1973).
59. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
60. Id. at 157-58, 486 P.2d at 154, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
61. This presumption of negligence is codified in California Evidence Code section
669(a):
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
California Business and Professions Code, California's liquor control
statute.62 Negligence principles were also discussed and the court
held that the defendant was not relieved of liability by the interven-
ing act of a third person (O'Connell's consumption of the alcohol) if
that act was foreseeable. 63
The Vesely court opposed leaving liquor liability decisions to the
legislature for two reasons. First, since the original common law rule
was judicially created, it could be struck down by the judiciary if
found to be in error.64 Second, the legislature had sufficiently ex-
pressed its intent in Evidence Code section 669 and Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 25602 to allow the court to impose liability.65
In 1976, Bernhard v. Harrah's Club66 extended the liability of ven-
dors to actions based on common law negligence rather than on the
violation of a statute, and in so doing, paved the way for even broader
liability. In Bernhard, the California Supreme Court was forced to
deal with this issue because the defendant, Harrah's Club, was an
out-of-state entity. Since section 25602 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code did not cover persons or entities acting outside the state,
the defendant argued that it was not civilly liable under the statute.6 7
The court decided that the traditional rule "was patently unsound
and totally inconsistent with the principles of proximate cause estab-
lished in other areas of negligence law."68 Therefore, the court ap-
plied principles of common law negligence to alcohol injuries and
found the defendant liable.
In 1978, the California Supreme Court in Coulter v. Superior
Court69 took a further step by imposing civil liability on noncommer-
cial suppliers of alcoholic beverages. In Coulter, the defendant fur-
nished alcohol to Janice Williams at an apartment complex party
with the knowledge that Williams often drank to excess, was in fact
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the
statute, ordinance or regulation, was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property
was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or
regulation was adopted.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a) (West Supp. 1988).
62. At that time, section 25606 of the California Business and Professions Code
provided that "Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished,
or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any
obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor." Vesely, 5 Cal. 3d at 165, 486
P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
63. Vesely, 5 Cal. 3d at 164, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
64. 1d& at 166, 486 P.2d at 160, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
65. I&
66. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
67. Id at 323-24, 546 P.2d at 726, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
68. Id, at 324, 546 P.2d at 726, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 222 (quoting Vesely, 5 Cal. 3d at
166, 486 P.2d at 160, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 632).
69. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
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doing so at the time, and intended to drive later that evening. The
plaintiff, a passenger in Williams' car, was injured when the car
crashed into roadway abutments due to Williams' impaired driving
ability.70
The court in Coulter recognized that section 25602 applied to social
hosts as well as commercial vendors, since the language of the statute
refers to "every person" who serves alcohol to an obviously intoxi-
cated person.71 Therefore, the court utilized the same statutory pre-
sumption of negligence concerning a noncommercial supplier of
alcohol as it did concerning a commercial supplier such as the one in
the earlier Vesely decision. In addition, liability of a social host was
not found to be inconsistent with common law principles of negli-
gence; serving alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person, who one
knows, or should know, intends to drive, "creates a reasonably fore-
seeable risk of injury to those on the highway."72 The court further
emphasized that the legislature, although on notice of the judicial de-
cisions imposing liability on the providers of alcohol under section
25602, had chosen not to preclude such liability by amending the stat-
ute.73 The court's emphasis is somewhat ironic in light of the state
legislature's prompt reaction after the Cotllter decision.
C. The Legislative Response
In 1978, the same year that Coulter was decided, the California
Legislature clarified its intent as to the effect of section 25602 by
drafting amendments in such a way as to leave little doubt regarding
the statute's application. It expressly abrogated the holdings in
70. Id. at 147-48, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
71. Id. at 150, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537. The court noted that when
limiting application to commercial suppliers, other sections of the code use more spe-
cific terminology such as "licensee." Id.; see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25601 (West
1985).
72. 21 Cal. 3d at 152-53, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539. The existence of a
duty to third persons was based on an analysis which had been recognized by Califor-
nia courts which applies factors other than foreseeability, including:
[T]he degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing fu-
ture harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved.
Id. at 153, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.
2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968)).
73. Id. at 151-52, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
Vesely, Bernhard, and Coulter, and provided civil immunity for sup-
pliers of alcohol, specifically including social hosts as immune par-
ties 74 The single statutory exception to this broad-based immunity
applied only to licensed sellers who provided alcohol to obviously in-
toxicated minors.75
Many suggest that the court's decision in Coulter prompted the leg-
islature's action. Supporting this proposition is the fact that the legis-
lature did not act after Vesely, yet passed legislation immediately
after the Coulter decision.76 Perhaps the legislature found the expan-
sion of liability to social hosts in Coulter to be the final straw.77
Since the legislature's findings and debates on this issue are not pub-
lished, it is difficult to pinpoint its rationale for passing these amend-
ments. Amid abundant speculation concerning the legislature's
intent, some suggest that since proximate cause is often an instru-
ment of policy, the legislature probably based its amendments en-
tirely on policy considerations.78 Others believe that the legislature
74. The following sections were added to section 25602:
(b) No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or
given away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section
shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for
injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of
such alcoholic beverage.
(c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so
that the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal, 3d 153), Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club (16 Cal. 3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior Court (21 Cal. 3d 144)
be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption
of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the
proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1985). In addition, the Legislature added sub-
sections (b) and (c) to section 1714 of the Civil Code:
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such
as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (16 Cal. 3d 313),
and Coulter v. Superior Court (21 Cal. 3d 144) and to reinstate the prior judi-
cial interpretation of this section as it relates to proximate cause for injuries
incurred as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person,
namely that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause
of injuries resulting from intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic
beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an in-
toxicated person.
(c) No social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person shall be
held legally accountable for damages suffered by such person, or for injury to
the person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the
consumption of such beverages.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985).
The legislature in Missouri followed a similar course of action by also abrogating
specific cases and returning to the "prior judicial interpretation" of the common law.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.053 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
75. See infra notes 91-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "obviously
intoxicated minor" exception.
76. Comment, California Liquor Liability, supra note 10, at 521 n.231.
77. Id.
78. Comment, Liquor, The Law, and California: One Step Forward-Two Steps
Backward, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 363 (1979) (discussing possible policy justifications for
the law).
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acted in response to pressures exerted by the liquor lobby and other
groups affected adversely by the Vesely and Coulter decisions.79
The constitutionality of the 1978 amendments was challenged in
Cory v. Shierloh.80 The plaintiff Cory, a minor, was injured when he
lost control of his vehicle after becoming intoxicated at a party. He
brought suit against various defendants, including the owner of the
premises where the party was held and the host of the party.S1 The
complaint was dismissed in light of the amendments to section 1714
of the Civil Code and section 25602 of the Business and Professions
Code.8 2 On appeal, Cory challenged the constitutionality of the 1978
amendments. The California Supreme Court somewhat reluctantly
upheld the constitutionality of the statute,8 3 finding itself "forced to
agree" with the trial court's disposition of the case.84 Although the
court felt there were "ample reasons for concluding" that the 1978
amendments were not "wise, sound, necessary, or in the public inter-
est,"8 5 the court would not substitute its judgment for that of the leg-
islature.86 "With effort," it found a reasonable basis for the
amendments.8 7
Regardless of the reasons for the legislature's actions, the fact re-
mains that the courts are once again bound by "prior judicial inter-
pretation" of proximate cause issues where the consumption of
alcohol is concerned.88 After the legislation was passed and the con-
stitutionality of the amendments was upheld, the courts faced the
task of determining exactly what the judicial interpretations were
prior to the Vesely trilogy, and what exceptions, if any, would apply
to the general rules of civil immunity.
D. Modern Application of the Early Common Law
The passage of the 1978 amendments to section 25602 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code and section 1714 of the Civil Code re-
79. Note, Strang v. Cabrol: Whose Interests are Being Served?, 13 W. ST. L. REV.
343 (1985).
80. 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981).
81. Id. at 434, 629 P.2d at 9, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
82. Id. at 433, 629 P.2d at 9, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
83. Id. at 436-37, 629 P.2d at 11, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
84. Id. at 441, 629 P.2d at 14, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
85. Id. at 436-38, 629 P.2d at 12, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
86. Id. at 438, 629 P.2d at 12, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
87. Id. at 441, 629 P.2d at 14, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
88. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West 1985); see also CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1714(b) (West 1985).
quired California courts to return to the common law as applied prior
to Vesely.8 9 Although confined to these traditional rules, it became
necessary for the courts to reconsider the limitations of the common
law scheme.90 Therefore, they were able to apply any exceptions that
existed at common law, as well as the statutory exception in section
25602.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
1. Statutory Exception-"Obviously Intoxicated" Minor
When the legislature amended section 25602 in 1978, section 25602.1
was also added to the statutory scheme imposing civil liability on the
licensed seller of alcohol who sold to an obviously intoxicated mi-
nor.91 The suggested reasons92 for this narrow exception to the gen-
eral rule of civil immunity seem to focus on the increased need for
protecting minors from the adverse effects of intoxication.9 3 This
need for greater protection stems from a minor's relative inexperi-
ence in both consuming alcohol and driving automobiles, and reflects
society's special concern in all areas which affect the well-being of
minors.9 4
This special concern for minors may have partially contributed to
the California Court of Appeal's decision in Burke v. Superior
89. For a discussion of the early common law in California, see supra notes 51-59
and accompanying text.
90. Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 130, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540, 544 (1981).
91. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West 1985).
Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of section 25602, a cause of action may be
brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death
against any person licensed pursuant to section 23300 who sells, furnishes,
gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic beverage to
any obviously intoxicated minor where the furnishing, sale or giving of such
beverage to the minor is the proximate cause of the personal injury or death
sustained by such person.
Id. In Burke v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 570, 181 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1982), disap-
proved on other grounds, 37 Cal. 3d 720, 728, 691 P.2d 1013, 1019, 209 Cal. Rptr. 347, 353
(1984), the court found that although the legislature had changed the general age of
majority from 21 to 18, the age of majority remained 21 in statutes relating to sale of
alcoholic beverages. Id. at 577-78, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 153; see also CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 25658 (West 1985).
92. Since the California Legislature does not publish legislative history or find-
ings, the true reasons for the amendments are not known. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 77-80 for suggested reasons.
93. Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 441, 629 P.2d 8, 14, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 506
(1981). For a discussion of Cory in the context of the constitutionality of the 1978
amendments, see supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
94. Cory, 29 Cal. 3d at 441, 629 P.2d at 14, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 506. In upholding the
constitutionality of the amendments, the California Supreme Court found that because
of this special concern for the well-being of minors, the legislature could reasonably
have limited the class of persons protected under the statute to minors. Id. Referring
to California Business and Professions Code section 25658 as evidence of society's con-
cern, the court determined that a reasonable basis existed for holding liable only de-
fendants who served to minors. Id.
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Court.O5 In Burke, a licensed seller was held liable for injuries occur-
ring after the sale of alcoholic beverages to a sober minor in violation
of Business and Professions Code section 25658.96 The court found
that the legislature had not specifically addressed the question of lia-
bility in the case of selling alcoholic beverages to a sober minor.97
Because of this silence, the court applied the common law, which
granted no immunity in such a situation.98 In the court's view, fore-
seeability was found to be the key in determining liability, and fore-
seeabiity would not be difficult to find where "public transportation
is the exception and driving the rule, and where keeping drunk driv-
ers off the road is a major social concern."99
Two years later, Burke was disapproved by Strang v. Cabrol.100
Since the legislature provided only one exception to civil immunity,
the Strang court applied the maxim expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius,101 which means "the expression of one thing is the exclusion
of another."'102 The court found that "an express exclusion from the
operation of the statute indicates the legislature intended no other
exceptions are to be implied."' 03 The court reasoned that had the
legislature intended to hold one who sold alcohol to a sober minor
civilly liable, it would have amended the statute to expressly provide
for such a cause of action.104 Thus, the first attempt to judicially alle-
viate the harshness of the new statutory scheme was foiled.
A second problem arising in the application of section 25602.1 was
first recognized in Cory v. Shierloh,o5 wherein the court discussed
the "patchwork of apparent inconsistencies and anomalies" contained
in the statute. For instance, under section 25602.1, a licensed seller
95. 129 Cal. App. 3d 570, 181 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1982), disapproved on other grounds,
37 Cal. 3d 720, 728, 691 P.2d 1013, 1019, 209 Cal. Rptr. 347, 353 (1984).
96. Id. at 579, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 154. Section 25658 provides that "[e]very person
who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished or given away, any alcoholic
beverage to any person under the age of 21 years is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658(a) (West 1985).
97. 129 Cal. App. 3d at 574, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
98. Id. at 576, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
99. Id. at 577, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
100. 37 Cal. 3d 720, 728, 691 P.2d 1013, 1019, 209 Cal. Rptr. 347, 353 (1984).
101. Id. at 725, 691 P.2d at 1016, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
102. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
103. 37 Cal. 3d at 726, 691 P.2d at 1016, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 350; see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979). "Under this maxim, if a statute specifies one exception
to a general rule... other exceptions or effects are excluded." Id.
104. 37 Cal. 3d at 725, 691 P.2d at 1016, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
105. 29 Cal. 3d 430, 440, 629 P.2d 8, 13, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505 (1981). For a discus-
sion of Cory in context of the constitutionality of the 1978 amendments, see supra
notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
could be liable after selling alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor
while a nonlicensed, illegal seller performing the same act would not
be liable, since the statute used the limiting term "licensed seller."o6
This, in effect, gave a "preferred liability status" to those sellers of
alcohol required to obtain a license but who neglect or refuse to do
S0.107
In 1986, an unexpected variation of the problem addressed in Cory
arose. In Gallea v. United States,l08 two obviously intoxicated minors
were served more alcohol at a club on a naval base.109 They left the
club on a motorcycle and one of the minors was killed when the mo-
torcycle crashed.110 Although the club operated as a commercial es-
tablishment, the State of California could not require it to be licensed
since it was controlled by the Department of Defense.ll Since the
club was not a "licensed seller," the plaintiffs were denied any recov-
ery under section 25602.1.112
In response to the Gallea case and the criticisms voiced in Cory, the
legislature in 1986 amended section 25602.1 to include clubs on mili-
tary bases and all sellers required to be licensed, regardless of
whether they actually obtain a license." 3
This statutory exception, as amended, will be narrowly construed
for several reasons. First, the Strang court's emphasis on the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius-one exception to the exclusion
of all others-indicates the judiciary's unwillingness to expand legis-
lative enactments. n 4 Second, the legislature has expressly addressed
the statutory construction problems courts have had in applying sec-
tion 25602.1,115 indicating the legislature's intent to keep a tight rein
on how the courts interpret this particular statute. Finally, the
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 779 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986).
109. Id. at 1403-04.
110. Id. at 1404.
111. Id. at 1403.
112. Id. at 1406.
113. Section 25602.1 now provides that:
Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of section 25602, a cause of action may be
brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death
against any person licensed, or required to be licensed, pursuant to section
23300, or any person authorized by the federal government to sell alcoholic
beverages on a military base or other federal enclave, who sells, furnishes,
gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic beverage, and
any other person who sells, or causes to be sold, any alcoholic beverage, to any
obviously intoxicated minor where the furnishing, sale or giving of that bever-
age to the minor is the proximate cause of the personal injury or death sus-
tained by that person.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis indicates changes or
additions by amendment).
114. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
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courts, as recently as 1987, have rejected the argument that social
hosts may in some situations be deemed "constructive licensees."116
This suggests that courts will construe "licensed or required to be li-
censed" language of the statute narrowly. In their application of sec-
tion 25602.1, the courts of appeal have quoted the Senate Committee
Judiciary staff report on Senate Bill No. 1053 (amending section
25602.1): "The bill would not, however, affect the existing immunities
for social hosts as it would not impose any liability for the free fur-
nishing of alcohol."1' 7 Therefore, it is difficult to see how courts can
extend application of section 25602.1 any further than they already
have.
2. Common Law Exception-Person Not of Ordinary Capacity
The Strang court noted that although the Burke decision was no
longer good law, selling alcohol to a minor who was "incompetent, in-
capable of voluntary action, or otherwise suffers from some peculiar
mental disability" could trigger the seller's liability under the com-
mon law rule in Cole.118 This question had previously been addressed
by the court in Cantor v. Anderson.119 In that case, the plaintiff,
Cantor, operated a home for the developmentally disabled. A neigh-
bor gave one of the home's residents alcoholic beverages and he be-
came intoxicated. While intoxicated, he returned to the home and
attacked Cantor, injuring her.120 Cantor brought suit against the
neighbor who supplied the alcohol. The court, quoting Cole exten-
sively, reasoned that the general rule of nonliability for furnishing al-
coholic beverages applied only to those serving liquor to ordinary,
competent individuals.121 It was also noted that the court in Cole
made a special effort to distinguish an Arizona case, Pratt v. Daly,122
which imposed liability on a vendor who sold alcohol to the plain-
116. Baker v. Sudo, 194 Cal. App. 3d 936, 941 n.6, 240 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41 n.6 (1987).
117. Id. at 944 n.10, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 43 n.10.
118. Strang v. Cabrol, 37 Cal, 3d 720, 726, 691 P.2d 1013, 1017, 209 Cal. Rptr. 347, 351
(1984).
119. 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1981).
120. Id.
121. Cantor, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 544. "There is 'no remedy for
injury or death following the mere sale of liquor to the ordinary man ....... "Id. (quot-
ing Cole, 45 Cal. 2d at 348, 289 P.2d at 452). The court in Cole held that "as to a compe-
tent person it is the voluntary consumption, not the sale or gift, of intoxicating liquor
which is the proximate cause of injury from its use," and "that the competent person
voluntarily consuming intoxicating liquor contributes directly to any injury caused
thereby .... " Cole, 45 Cal. 2d at 356, 289 P.2d at 457 (emphasis added).
122. 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940).
tiff's husband, knowing that he was "incapable of voluntary ac-
tion."123 The court therefore concluded that an exception to the
common law rule could be found where "an injury is the joint prod-
uct of an exceptional mental or physical condition and alcohol."124
The court in Cantor clearly stated the elements which a plaintiff
must plead and prove to assert this exception: (1) the drinker had an
exceptional mental or physical condition; 125 (2) the defendant knew
of the condition;126 and (3) the defendant knew or should have
known the effect the alcohol would have on the drinker.127 The
court warned, however, that a retarded or developmentally disabled
person is not automatically presumed to be "incapable of handling al-
cohol consumption."1 28 The alcohol must cause some known extreme
effect on the disabled person because of the disability.129
The court in Bass v. Pratt 130 grappled with the question of capacity
in cases involving a minor. The plaintiffs brought suit against par-
ents who served alcohol at a party, knowing that some of the guests
present were under twenty-one years of age.' 13 Since section 25602.1
allowed liability only in the case of licensed sellers, the plaintiffs
could not recover under that statute.132 The plaintiffs then brought
in an expert witness to testify that a young person was affected to a
greater extent by alcohol than the ordinary competent adult.133 In
other words, youth alone could be an "exceptional mental or physical
condition" falling under the exception to the common law rule.134
The court rejected this argument on the basis that "[t]he Cole defini-
tion of 'ordinary [person]' who voluntarily consumes liquor embraces
a minor engaging in the same conduct, absent some additional show-
ing that the minor is incompetent, incapable of voluntary action, or
otherwise suffers from some peculiar mental disability."'' 35
One possible application of the capacity exception not yet ad-
dressed by the California courts is the effect of alcoholism on compe-
123. Cantor, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 545 (quoting Cole, 45 Cal. 2d
at 354, 289 P.2d at 455).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 131, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
127. Id.; see also Bass v. Pratt, 177 Cal. App. 3d 129, 136, 222 Cal. Rptr. 723, 728
(1986).
128. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 132, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
129. Id.
130. 177 Cal. App. 3d 129, 222 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1986).
131. Id. at 130, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
132. Id. at 134, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
133. Id. at 136, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Strang v. Cabrol, 37 Cal. 3d 720, 726, 691 P.2d 1013, 1017, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 347, 351 (1984)); see also Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 287, 162 P.2d 125, 126-27
(1945). "It cannot be said as a matter of law that a child of fifteen has neither will nor
choice nor discretion ..... Id.
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tency. In denying liability in Cole, the court distinguished an Arizona
case, Pratt v. Daly,136 wherein the defendant sold alcohol to the
plaintiff's husband with knowledge that he was a "habitual drunk-
ard."'137 The court noted that traditionally, a habitual drunkard was
one who had lost the will power to refuse a drink.138 A habitual
drunkard who was "incapable of voluntary action" was contrasted
with the drinker in Cole, who showed no such lack of volition.1i 9
This analysis suggests that if proven that an alcoholic is a person
without control over his drinking habits and that the defendant knew
this, yet still served him, the defendant could be liable for the result-
ing injuries. 140
3. Common Law Exception-Respondeat Superior
The California Court of Appeal discussed a third exception to the
general rule of nonliability for serving alcohol in Childers v. Shasta
Livestock Auction Yard, Inc. 141 In Childers, the plaintiff was an em-
ployee of the defendant Shasta.142 On the suggestion of their super-
visor, the plaintiff and two other employees went to the supervisor's
office to drink beer normally kept there.143 Later that same evening,
the plaintiff and Abbott, one of the employees, also drank hard li-
quor in the supervisor's office with one of Shasta's customers. 4 4
Later, the plaintiff and Abbott went on an errand in Abbott's
truck.145 On the way, Abbott drove her truck off the road, killing
herself and injuring the plaintiff.i 46 The plaintiff brought suit
against Shasta based on the theory of respondeat superior. 47 After
136. 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940).
137. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 353, 289 P.2d 450, 454-55 (1955).
138. Id. at 353, 289 P.2d at 455.
139. Id, at 354, 289 P.2d at 455.
140. The decision in Pratt v. Daly was based on the common law rule allowing a
spouse to recover for injuries resulting from habit-forming drugs. Id. at 353, 289 P.2d
at 455. Although recovery in such cases is usually limited to a spouse as plaintiff, the
court's reliance on Pratt in Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540
(1981), where no such relationship existed, suggests that recovery will not be subject to
such a limitation.
141. 190 Cal. App. 3d 792, 235 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1987).
142. Id at 799, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
143. Id. at 799, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id,
147. Id The respondeat superior theory is codified in the California Civil Code
which provides that:
[A] principal is responsible to third persons for the negligence of his agent in
the transaction of the business of the agency, including wrongful acts commit-
discussing the application of respondeat superior to the case at hand,
the court determined that the plaintiff's cause of action was not
barred by Civil Code section 1714 or Business and Professions Code
section 25602.148 The court stated that the common law as it existed
before the Vesely, Bernhard, and Coulter decisions allowed recovery
from an employer based on respondeat superior where one was in-
jured by an employee who drank while within the scope of his em-
ployment.149 Thus, respondeat superior constitutes a third exception
to nonliability for servers of alcohol.
The C'hilders court then decided that in any event, section 1714 and
section 25602 were inapplicable to a respondeat superior claim.150
Those sections state that the consumption, rather than the serving of
alcoholic beverages, is the proximate cause of any resulting inju-
ries.15 1 Under respondeat superior, it is the employee's consumption
of alcohol while within the scope of employment, not the employer's
furnishing it, that creates liability.152 The court cited two examples
of liability being imposed without the employer supplying the alco-
hol: (1) when an employee drinks alcohol supplied by other employ-
ees with the employer's permission; and (2) when a client serves
alcohol at a function which the employee is required by his employer
to attend.1 53 In these cases, liability is based on consumption not on
the employer serving the alcohol, and therefore, the claim is not
barred by statute.
Similarly, the court in Childers found this result to be consistent
with the reasoning in Cole.154 The Cole decision distinguished situa-
tions where liability was based upon duties independent of serving al-
cohol.155 Under respondeat superior, liability is founded upon an
employee's consumption of alcohol within the scope of his employ-
ment, and in no way relates to the serving of alcohol. Therefore, this
ted 'by such agent in and as a part of the transaction of such business, and for
his willful omission to fulfill the obligations of the principal.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 2338 (West 1985).
148. 190 Cal. App. 3d at 806-10, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 648-50.
149. I& at 809, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 650 (citing Boynton v. McKales, 139 Cal. App. 2d
777, 294 P.2d 733 (1956)).
150. 190 Cal. App. 3d at 807, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 649. This rule was traced back to De-
bolt v. Kragen Auto Supply, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 3d 269, 227 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1986), and
eventually to Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 120 Cal. App. 3d 157, 174 Cal. Rptr. 452
(1981).
151. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1985); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(c) (West
1985).
152. 190 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
153. Id.
154. Id, at 809, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 650. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Cole v. Rush.
155. 190 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 650 (citing Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d
345, 352-53, 289 P.2d 450, 454 (1955)).
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theory is not at odds with Cole since it has an independent basis for
imposing liability.
Finally, the Childers court emphasized the fairness of its deci-
sion.156 For an employer to be responsible for injuries resulting from
the consumption of alcohol by employees, this consumption must in
some sense benefit the employer.157 Because the employer stands to
benefit from the employee's consumption of alcohol in some settings,
"fairness requires that the enterprise should bear the burden of inju-
ries proximately caused by the employees' consumption."1 58
4. Other Judicial Limitations on the Common Law Rule
The California courts have also expressed a willingness to limit the
common law rule in instances where reckless behavior is involved
and in certain other social host situations. A commercial server's lia-
bility for reckless behavior was discussed in Ewing v. Cloverleaf
Bowl.159 In Ewing, an employee of the defendant bowling alley
served the decedent ten straight shots of 151-proof rum, two beers,
and a mixed drink, all within the time period of an hour and a
half.160 The decedent later died of acute alcohol poisoning. The
court addressed the case under a recklessness standard of conduct, as
well as negligence standards,161 and held that in some cases, the ser-
vice of alcohol which leads to alcohol poisoning could be considered
willful misconduct by the bartender.16 2
Although decided before the 1978 amendments to section 25602 of
the Business and Professions Code and section 1714 of the Civil Code,
the Ewing case was not rendered ineffective in those amendments
primarily because it does not fall into the same class as the Vesely,
Bernard, and Coulter cases which were specifically abrogated. Those
156. Id. at 810, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
157. Id. at 805, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
158. Id. at 810, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 651. Liability under respondeat superior depends
upon a finding that alcohol was consumed within the scope of the employment. The
court set forth the tests first posed in Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d
608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975) which were: (1) foreseeabiity of the risk; and (2) risk of
industrial origin. See Cole, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 803-04, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 646 for further
discussion of these tests.
159. 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
160. Id. at 394, 572 P.2d at 1156, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
161. Id. at 398-407, 572 P.2d at 1159-64, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 17-23.
162. If the bartender was guilty of willful misconduct and the drinker did not as-
sume the risk of alcohol poisoning, the plaintiff would be able to recover despite any
contributory negligence. Id. at 401, 572 P.2d at 1161, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 19; Accord Davies
v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 769, 602 P.2d 605, 609 (1979) (recovery on basis of willful or wan-
ton misconduct not barred by contributory negligence).
three cases were all based on common law negligence principles and
violations of California's liquor control statute.163 Furthermore, the
language of the statutory amendments speaks in terms of the negli-
gence element of "proximate cause" without mentioning a more egre-
gious level of conduct, such as recklessness or willful misconduct.16 4
For these reasons, it appears that the statutory immunity could be in-
terpreted as not prohibiting liability when the drinker is injured or
killed due to recklessly serving alcoholic beverages.
A second situation where California courts have expressed reluc-
tance to extend the boundaries of the common law rule of nonliabil-
ity is found in Blake v. Moore.16 5 The social host in Blake not only
furnished alcohol to a guest, but also negligently entrusted the intox-
icated person with his vehicle.16 6 The court refused to extend statu-
tory immunity in such a case167 and held that immunity does not
encompass all circumstances in which a social host furnishes alco-
hol.168 Even if alcohol is provided and its consumption contributes to
an accident, a server may still be held liable based on other concur-
rent causes of action. 69
These two examples, as well as the other recognized exceptions to
the common law rule of nonliability,170 suggest that California courts
are willing to impose reasonable limitations on the common law rule
and discover means by which to temper its harshness.
163. See text accompanying notes 63-65, 69, and 72-73 for a discussion of the various
bases of liability. For a more general treatment of each of the bases of liability, see
supra text accompanying notes 10-42.
164. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602(c), 25602.1 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); see
also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(b) (West 1985); cf Grasser v. Fleming, 74 Mich. App. 338,
253 N.W.2d 757 (1977) (action for willful, wanton, or intentional conduct not precluded
by dram shop act when bartender served alcohol to known compulsive alcoholic in
spite of agreement not to serve).
165. 162 Cal. App. 3d 700, 208 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1984).
166. Id at 701, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
167. Id. at 704, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 706. But cf Debolt v. Kragen Auto Supply, Inc.,
182 Cal. App. 3d 269, 227 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1986) (social host not liable for ordering an
intoxicated guest to leave); Andre v. Ingram, 164 Cal. App. 3d 206, 210 Cal. Rptr. 150
(1985) (social host not liable for forcing guest to leave or failing to provide
transportation).
168. 162 Cal. App. 3d at 704, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
169. Id. The court relied heavily on the Restatement of Torts:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because
of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving un-
reasonable risk of physical harm to himself or others whom the supplier
should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for
physical harm resulting to them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
170. See supra notes 91-117 and accompanying text (obviously intoxicated minor),
notes 118-141 and accompanying text (person not of ordinary capacity), and notes 142-
159 and accompanying text (respondeat superior).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The California courts have subtly whittled away at the statutorily
enforced common law rule of nonliability with respect to servers of
alcohol. Since the California Supreme Court expressed its doubts
concerning the statute's wisdom, necessity, and furtherance of the
public interest, the common law rule has been eroded by exceptions
and judicial refusals to extend the rule to seemingly logical lengths.
Although the California Legislature led the trend to curtail liabil-
ity for serving alcohol, the courts have taken a more realistic ap-
proach, providing redress for injuries in certain situations. This
judicial action may reflect social awareness of the problem of driving
under the influence of alcohol, and could signal a new trend-a prac-
tical approach to solving the problem of drunk driving.
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